

29 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 11 a.m., 29 September

1. Present were Secretary Vance, General Carter, Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.

2. The meeting opened by Mr. Vance stating that he had several things he wished to take up with me. It was apparent that he had been well briefed prior to the meeting and had copious notes from which he spoke. Action: For future guidance, this is a technique that might well be adopted by DCI and DDCI. Also, since McMillan appears to be thoroughly witting of most of the activities on the West Coast and Fubini has no hesitancy about speaking authoritatively on any subject, I consider it advisable to have the DCI backstopped by Mr. Bross and Dr. Wheelon from here on out. Additionally, I consider it highly desirable, as a result of the attacks placed upon me today, that we have an advance agenda if we're going to discuss matters substantively.

3. Mr. Vance stated that he had been briefed on a contracting problem at the Advanced Projects Area for Lockheed (Sunnyvale, which he called "The Little Skunkworks"). He stated that there appeared to be three contracts in question -- one on the installation of the Stellar Index Camera, one on systems integration with Lockheed, and one amounting to a piddling [redacted] for some pin-pullers or other incidental hardware. He stated it was his understanding that our Security Officer had instructed Lockheed not to sign any of these contracts and that as a result thereof, Lockheed did not sign the contracts. Dr. McMillan stated that as soon as he had found out there was a security problem, he had convened a panel including CIA membership and that the security panel had now obtained full agreement as to the procedures that should be followed at Lockheed. Vance urged, therefore, that we now lift our ban on signing the contracts.

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- 2 -

4. I stated that I had not seen the panel report on security but that if CIA members had agreed to it and as soon as I had checked it out in the Agency with my own Security people and if it gave me no problem, I was prepared to accept it. I stated, however, that this was not prejudging the merits of having Greer complete the three contracts in question. McMillan said he took a dim view of holding up projects on the basis of security when in fact security was not the matter questioned. I stated clearly for the record that, so far as I knew, the Director had not authorized any changes of any kind in the CORONA Program and that it had been agreed that no changes would be made without DCI approval. This included contracts as well as security procedures. I further stated that [] had telephoned me from Lockheed and I had reiterated this statement. [] confirmed that this was his understanding and this was the basis for a letter he had furnished McMillan. I stated that I had called McMillan and told him of my conversation with [] and that there should have been no misunderstanding. McMillan then quoted from a letter Greer had gotten from [] tending to substantiate McMillan's claim that Mr. McDonald, our contracting officer, had instructed [] not to sign the contracts. I stated I had not seen the letter but McDonald's instructions to Lockheed were identical with my instructions to [] and that it would please me to get a copy of the [] letter. McMillan said he would furnish me a copy. McMillan then said that it was his clear understanding that taking Aerospace on in the CORONA Program included adjustment of the systems integration and systems engineering contract with Lockheed so that it would be an Air Force contract. He stated that it involved nineteen people out of Lockheed and that the contract had previously been Air Force's but last year had been handled by []. All he wanted to do now was to get it back under Air Force auspices. McMillan said this was part and parcel of the Aerospace function and he could not operate without it under Air Force auspices. I stated that I had no intention of authorizing this kind of contract without Mr. McCone's approval and, further, I had no intention of establishing the kind of CIA backstopping and input that had previously been agreed on the West Coast under these circumstances. I stated

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- 3 -

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that participation in the CORONA Program was a two-way street and required not only clean intent but cooperation as well. I stated that I had no intention whatsoever of building up a CIA asset on the West Coast to leave it out in left field and that it was my ^{clear} understanding that we had agreed to consolidate the CIA as the CORONA Program across the boards and, specifically, to cover the entire payload which was CIA responsibility. Fubini interjected at this point to indicate that I was welching on a prior agreement and that the understanding was purely to send one or two men to the West Coast to work with Greer's organization to learn more about the program and increase their competence. I refused to accept the word "welching" and required him to withdraw it which he did threefold. McMillan stated that it was his understanding that I was to develop a plan by which [redacted] and others would go to the West Coast. I stated that I had such a plan but the Director had left in such a hurry on his trip that I had not had time to clear it with him; that as soon as he returned I would develop the full particulars and inform the Executive Committee of what we plan to do. I reiterated that I was not prepared to establish a group on the West Coast to "watch the parade go by," but that they would have full responsibility for all security and all contracting presently handled by CIA and, in addition, they would sign off on and deliver a complete payload to the agency responsible for tying it into the booster and firing it. In addition, they would follow along throughout the entire process to ensure that the marriage was properly consummated. I stated that I was not reneging on Mr. McCone's prior reluctant acceptance of the majority view to have Aerospace in the act although we were still of the opinion it was a bad idea. I stated that I was not agreeing to the Stellar Index Camera changes at this time because my main concern was the collection of intelligence and that we had had a remarkably successful CORONA Program throughout the months since May. It was my understanding that the changes proposed for SIC would probably not be effective until late next spring and that they were designed primarily to augment a military mapping program. Fubini confirmed this and I said I was not prepared to take the risk of messing up a good intelligence collection program until our technicians and

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McMillan

- 4 -

experts had fully signed off on the new proposals as being totally feasible and in keeping with intelligence collection. McMillan said he had written in June of 1963 to Greer and Ledford, telling them to get on board this program and work jointly on it and that CIA had had every opportunity to be a full participant in the new program but had been uncooperative throughout. I reiterated my position that I was not here to indulge in vituperation and histrionics but I was here to protect the interests of the intelligence community and I was not convinced that this type of activity would so protect it.

25X1 5. Vance asked me to take a look at the panel report on security handling of the contracts at the Advanced Projects Area and if this gave me no problem, to see if I could not go along with the systems integration transfer to Lockheed as an Air Force contract and the small [] hardware contract. I told him if it did not involve the payload (which nobody seemed to know), I would discuss it with my people and see if it gave us a problem. McMillan said it was his belief that it did not in any way involve the payload but was purely the systems engineering of tying the payload into the booster. However, he was not sure of this and would have to check it himself. As can be seen from the foregoing, the discussion was relatively inconclusive and I made no commitments except to look at the problems in the light of this discussion. Action: DD/S&T to advise me so that we can thoroughly clue in Mr. McCone prior to any other meetings. Also, advise me as to any agreements we have made on security handling in connection with the panel report mentioned by Dr. McMillan. Also, to get the copy of the Lockheed letter and analyze it as to facts. It is perfectly apparent that NRO and McMillan are keeping very close book on all of the CIA actions and responses to their requests.

6. Mr. Vance brought up the problem of vulnerability of the OXCART, particularly as it was concerned with radar cross section. He stated that the original estimates on radar cross section had been increased four or five times from what we had hoped for and that he just wasn't sure whether we had accurate